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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The primary question presented for review is whether 
Petitioner's petition raises the special considerations set forth 
in Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, governing review 
of appellate court decisions by the Utah Supreme Court. 
2. A secondary issue presented for review is whether the 
facts of this case, along with the proceedings that have taken 
place, in any way present a question that should be considered by 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision on May 22, 
1990. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-4 (1986), and Rule 45, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The only controlling provision which applies to the decision 
to grant or deny a petition for a Writ of Certiorari is Rule 46, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. That rule provides: 
Review by writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, 
but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only 
for special and important reasons. The following, 
while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of 
reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict 
with a decision of another panel of the Court 
of Appeals on the same issue of law; and 
(b) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided an issue of st^te or 
federal law in a way that is in conflict with 
a decision of the Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so 
far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court 
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme 
Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important question of municipal, 
state or federal law which has not been, but 
should be, settled by the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Action. 
This is a case involving a claim of medical malpractice 
against Dr. Gerald N. Goodman and his employer, Bryner Clinic. 
The Plaintiff claims that Dr. Goodman caused him to become addic-
ted to prescription medications which resulted in the Plaintiff 
losing his job, embezzling money from his employer, embezzling 
money from the Mormon Church, and causing substantial related 
damages, including the conviction of a felony (R. pp. 2-8). 
The case was tried to a jury beginning October 4, 1988. The 
jury returned its Special Verdict on October 13, 1988. The jury 
found that Dr. Goodman and his employer were negligent but also 
determined that Dr. Goodman's negligence was not a proximate 
cause of the Plaintiff's damage. The jury also found that the 
Plaintiff was negligent, that his negligence was a proximate 
cause of his own damages, and that the Plaintiff was more than 
50% at fault. (R. pp. 546-48). 
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The District Court Judge James S. Sawaya entered his 
Judgment on the Special Verdict on October 25, 1988. 
(R. pp. 577-78). The Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or for New Trial. 
(R. pp. 549-61). That motion was denied by Jtidge Sawaya on 
October 31, 1988 and his Order denying the motion was entered on 
November 9, 1988. (R. pp. 591-92). 
The Plaintiff subsequently appealed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Court of Appeals filed its decision May 22, 1990 
affirming the judgment of the lower court. (Petitioner's Brief, 
App. A). It is from the affirmance of the Court of Appeals that 
the Petitioner seeks review. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The "Statement of Facts" set out in Plaintiff's petition is 
blatantly distorted, often erroneous, completely disjointed, and 
attempts to paint a picture of the Plaintiff as a young man who 
was on the road to a successful career, morally without problem, 
and who would have undoubtedly succeeded had he not fallen prey 
to Dr. Goodman (and, later on, to Dr. Goodman's attorney's 
devious and unethical defense). The facts thit were actually 
presented at trial are totally contrary. Mr. Quistberg admitted 
under cross-examination that he was a liar (TL pp. 234-242), 
embezzler (T. p. 228), thief (T. pp. 286-87), perjurer 
(T. p. 557), drug abuser (T. p. 240), and convicted felon 
(T. p. 261). He admitted that he abused prescription medications 
before he went to see Dr. Goodman (T. pp. 189^90, 498-501, 
506-12), he admitted that he was dishonest before he ever saw 
Dr. Goodman (T. pp. 371, 532-36, 560-62), he admitted that he 
perjured himself on at least two separate occasions (T. pp. 557-
59, 564-66). He admitted that he manipulated doctors and 
pharmacists in order to obtain prescription drugs (T. pp. 515-
31). He admitted that he embezzled more than $70,000 from his 
employer (T. pp. 227-31) and more than $13,000 from his church 
(T. pp. 286-87) . 
The first issue presented by the Plaintiff at the trial was 
whether Dr. Gerald goodman had failed to take an adequate history 
and conduct a proper examination when he originally prescribed a 
controlled substance to Mr. Quistberg for relief of headaches. 
The Plaintiff's theory of the case was that from the date of that 
original prescription, Mr. Quistberg became more and more depen-
dent upon the medication which was prescribed by Dr. Goodman and 
he continually had the prescription refilled. That particular 
prescription was always refilled at the same pharmacy and, 
according to the pharmacist who was a co-defendant at the trial, 
he would telephone Bryner Clinic to obtain authorization for 
refills of the prescription as required by law. Dr. Goodman 
testified at his deposition and at trial, as did his nurses, that 
neither he nor they ever authorized any refills of the prescrip-
tion. (T. pp. 71-75) 
According to Mr. Quistberg, over the course of several 
years, he became addicted to the narcotic medication and began 
seeking other medication from other physicians. The record was 
replete with prescription records from numerous pharmacies and 
dozens of doctors (R. pp. 312-25). Mr. Quistberg admitted, 
because the record so indicated, that his drug seeking behavior 
began well before he obtained the prescriptioh from Dr. Goodman 
(T. pp. 189-90, 498-501, 506-12). 
Mr. Quistberg was employed by First Interstate Bank and, 
during the year 1984 embezzled more than $70,000 from his 
employer. It was after he was terminated that he attempted to 
blame his overuse of medications for the embezzlement and his 
poor judgment. In spite of this, he continued to abuse medica-
tions, to manipulate doctors and pharmacies, and finally, to even 
lie to his own expert psychologist, Dr. Michael Decaria (T. pp. 
371-72), and his own attorney. Further, on at least two occa-
sions when his deposition was taken, he perjured himself. This 
was admitted at the trial. 
The Statement of Facts set forth by Petitioner refers to 
various claims by the Plaintiff that the jury may or may not have 
believed. The fact that they found Dr. Goodman to be negligent 
may have related to the claim that he did not perform a proper 
examination or evaluation to begin with, to the original pre-
scription for the narcotic medication, or to the failure to 
closely monitor whether prescriptions were being refilled. All 
one can determine from the jury verdict is that they found the 
doctor to be negligent. 
In Petitioner's "Statement of the Case," on page 3, he makes 
the claim that "plaintiff was not allowed at trial to ask the 
doctor as to each refill, if he knew the condition then of his 
patient, and what hazards were indicated in the patient's gradual 
increase and frequency of refills." Petitioner does not cite to 
the record. The reason he does not cite to the record is because 
this statement is blatantly untrue. The Plaintiff was not denied 
the right to ask the doctor any questions at the trial of this 
case. In fact, he was interrogated intensely on cross-examination 
by Plaintiff's counsel about each of these issues (T. pp. 71-76, 
687-95, Supp. T. pp. 3-7). 
Another example of Petitioner's attempt to manipulate the 
facts to give this Court an improper impression is set forth on 
page 3 of his Petition. He states "Dr. Goodman was the only 
doctor prescribing a highly addictive drug, the only doctor 
prescribing anything from April to September 1983 . . . and 
Plaintiff had seen no doctor and had no medications in the seven 
months before Dr. Goodman first prescribed the Fiorinal #3. . • ." 
In fact, from the prescription records that Defendants were able 
to obtain, and these prescription records are undoubtedly incom-
plete, Defendants were able to show that Mr. Quistberg was 
obtaining controlled substances as early as 1981. There were 
prescription receipts for Tylenol with codeine, Empirin with 
codeine, and Didrex. In August of 1982, which was only two months 
after Dr. Goodman prescribed Fiorinal #3, Mr. Quistberg was 
obtaining drugs containing codeine from Dr. Haight. In September 
of 1982 he was obtaining drugs containing codeine from Dr. Van 
Orden. In February, March and April of 1983 Mr. Quistberg was 
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obtaining drugs from Drs. Barton and Haight. According to 
Appendix F, which is attached to Plaintiff's petition, one can see 
the pattern of manipulation by Mr. Quistberg (Petitloner's Brief, 
App. F, T. pp. 563-65). 
The final point that Defendant would addjcess in this State-
ment of Facts concerns Petitioner's claim that Defendant perjured 
himself during his deposition (and at the trial) and that he was 
advised to do so by his attorney. The issue is addressed by 
Petitioner in Points I and II of his argument. Petitioner 
contends that during the Defendant's deposition the Defendant was 
about to make an admission concerning authorizing refills for 
medication when he was taken from the deposition room by his 
attorney and advised to perjure himself. A review of the depo-
sition transcript shows that this is just not true. In fact, Dr. 
Goodman had denied on numerous occasions that he ever authorized 
any refills. The question that was put to hipi was a hypothetical 
question only and he appeared to be confused about the hypothe-
tical question. It was at this point in time that Dr. Goodman's 
counsel attempted to give him some advise to clear up the nature 
of the question. Plaintiff's attorney refused to allow such 
advise to be given during the deposition and so defense counsel 
took a recess and met with Dr. Goodman in his| office (T. pp. 
687-92). 
This entire scenario was re-enacted in front of the jury and 
they were given an explanation about what was going on by the 
Court (T. pp. 687-95). The only questions that the Court refused 
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to allow Plaintiff's counsel to ask or to be answered were ques-
tions concerning the conversation that went on between Dr. Goodman 
and his attorney. The Court sustained the objection based on a 
claim of attorney-client privilege. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 
49(a)(9), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
THE PETITION DOES NOT STATE ANY SPECIAL OR 
IMPORTANT REASONS WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD BE 
GRANTED AS REQUIRED BY RULE 46, UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
The rules of appellate procedure clearly state that "review 
by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion, and will be granted only for special and important 
reasons•" Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Plain-
tiff's Petition does not purport to state any special and 
important reasons, and certainly does not enumerate any of the 
four reasons set forth in Rule 46. 
The Utah Court of Appeals decision, which is set out as 
Appendix A to Plaintiff's Petition, cuts through the Petitioner's 
attempt to distort the record. Page 2 of the Opinion says: 
Appellant has neglected to fulfill either aspect of his 
burden on appeal. He merely refers us to evidence in 
the 25 volume record that would support a finding con-
trary to the one actually made by the jury. In light 
of appellant's failure to marshall the supporting evi-
dence and to demonstrate its insufficiency, we decline 
to consider further appellant's challenge to the jury's 
finding in its Special Verdict. 
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Clearly, the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case is 
not in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court, nor has the 
Court of Appeals rendered a decision in this case that has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court 
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of super-
vision. These are the requirements of Rule 46(b) and (c)# Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Rule 49(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states 
that a petition for writ of certiorari shall Contain with respect 
to each question presented, a "direct and concise argument 
explaining the special and important reasons as provided in Rule 
46 for the issuance of the Writ." In this ca$e, Petitioner makes 
no reference to Rule 46 nor does its Petition comport with any of 
the stated considerations governing review of certiorari as set 
forth in Rule 46. 
In Lee v. Provo City Civil Service Commission, 582 P.2d 485 
(Utah 1978), the Court stated: 
It has long been the law in this jurisdiction that 
pleadings seeking relief by way of certiorari must 
specifically designate the jurisdictional excess or 
abuse of discretion claimed and that pleadings which 
merely set forth conclusions are to be dismissed. The 
reasoning behind the rule is simple. In the absence of 
specific allegations, the nature and extent of the 
review ceases to be limited and invites t^ he Court to 
substitute its judgment for that of the inferior 
tribunal, board or officer. 
In the instant case, it is incumbent upon the Petitioner to 
plead in accordance with Rule 46 exactly what jurisdictional 
excess he believes the Court to have abused. Since the Peti-
tioner has failed to do so, there is essentially nothing for the 
Court to review and his Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be 
denied. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY AFFIRMED 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
A
* The Court of Appeals Properly Determined that the Evidence 
Supported a Finding of No Proximate Cause as to the 
Defendants. 
In medical malpractice cases, the Plaintiff has the burden 
of proving that the defendant proximately caused the injury. 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980); Hoooiiaina v. 
Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270 (1987). In this case, 
the jury returned its verdict finding that although the Defen-
dant, Dr. Gerald Goodman, was negligent, his negligence was not a 
proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injury. As noted by the Utah 
Court of Appeals, the trial court should be reversed only if, 
when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party who prevailed, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict. Hanson v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). There 
appears to be no claim in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury 
verdict. There is, therefore, no reason to reverse the verdict. 
Further, there was ample evidence in the record, from numerous 
experts, which would support a finding that whatever Dr. Goodman 
did not cause Plaintiff's injury and that Plaintiff himself 
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caused his own injury. Evidence was presented at trial that the 
Plaintiff was dishonest and had drug seeking behavior before he 
ever met Mr. Goodman. There was evidence that he had credit 
problems before he ever took Dr. Goodman's prescription. The 
Special Verdict of the jury clearly show that the jurors felt 
that Mr. Quistberg was responsible for his own behavior. That 
finding, in and of itself, should render all of the arguments of 
the Plaintiff moot. 
B. Defendants Deposition Conduct or "Misconduct" Purina the 
Pretrial Deposition Is Not the Basis for a Reversal. 
Petitioner has deliberately distorted the events that 
occurred during a pretrial deposition of the Defendant, 
Dr. Gerald Goodman. He has accused Defendant's counsel of 
suborning perjury and has accused the Defendant of perjuring 
himself. Such claims seem incredible in light of the fact that 
Mr. Quistberg, himself, admitted on the witneps stand that he had 
perjured himself on numerous occasions during two different 
depositions. 
What actually happened during the deposition occurred 
because Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Sam King, was repeatedly 
badgering Dr. Goodman about whether he would have refilled 
prescriptions for Mr. Quistberg assuming a certain set of facts. 
Dr. Goodman had repeatedly denied that he ever authorized any 
refills of the prescriptions. At one point, when Mr. King asked 
another hypothetical question, Dr. Goodman appeared confused and 
so counsel for Dr. Goodman leaned over to whijsper something in 
his ear. At this point, Mr. King became highly animated and 
shouted at counsel for Defendant. At that point, counsel for 
Defendant insisted that a recess be taken. Mr. King refused and 
leaped in front of the door of the conference room, barring 
counsel and Dr. Goodman from leaving. Eventually a recess was 
taken and the deposition resumed. 
Petitioner and his counsel claim that they were denied the 
right to ask Dr. Goodman questions. In fact, they continued to 
ask Dr. Goodman questions about refilling prescriptions and got 
the same answers they had received from Dr. Goodman throughout 
the deposition — that he never refilled prescriptions. 
On page 3 of Petitioner's Brief, it is claimed: 
Plaintiff was not allowed at trial to ask the doctor as 
to each refill, if he knew the condition then of the 
patient, and what hazards were indicated in the 
patient's gradual increase in frequency of refills. 
This is a blatant distortion of the facts. Mr. King was not 
denied the right to ask Dr. Goodman about this at trial and, in 
fact, did ask him on numerous occasions whether he authorized 
refills. 
The Court also allowed Petitioner's counsel to re-enact the 
entire scenario that occurred at the deposition. That portion of 
the deposition was read to the jury. One might even assume, 
based on the jury's finding that Dr. Goodman was negligent, that 
he actually did authorize refills on numerous occasions. Since 
the jury did not find any proximate cause, and since this 
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argument does not go to proximate cause, then the argument means 
nothing with regard to the merits of this case. 
Pages 4 through 14 of Plaintiff's Petition discuss the 
issue of whether an attorney can advise his client during a 
deposition. In fact, the jury was told that the Defendant 
received advise. The only thing that was withheld from the jury 
was the specific advise that was given to Dr. Goodman. In that 
respect, Judge Sawaya properly upheld the attorney-client privi-
lege. The Petitioner refers to the case of Huffman v. Conder, 
712 P.2d 216 (Utah 1985). The Hoffman case definitely stands for 
the proposition that attorney-client conversations are privi-
leged. The only requirement is that the party and the attorney 
must have intended the conversation to be privileged and confi-
dential. Clearly, advise given during a recetes at a deposition 
was intended to be confidential. 
Finally, it is hard to believe that the petitioner claims 
that Dr. Goodman was told to change his answer or to answer 
untruthfully. As can be seen from a review of the deposition, 
Dr. Goodman consistently denied that he had ever authorized any 
refills of the prescription. The context of the question that 
was asked was hypothetical. After the brief recess at the 
deposition, Dr. Goodman continued to give the same consistent 
answers as he had done before the recess. At no time did he 
change his testimony. To imply defense counsel convinced his 
client to perjure himself as has been argued by Petitioner is 
offensive and inappropriate. 
The Utah Court of Appeals considered Petitioner's argument. 
The Court determined that the conversation between Dr. Goodman 
and his counsel was privileged pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-24-8(2) (1987). Further, the Court noted that Mr. 
Quistberg's counsel did not act on his objections to what 
transpired at the deposition until the trial. He did not file a 
Motion to Compel under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Court of Appeals properly found that "contrary to appellant's 
repeated mischaracterizations, Goodman was not on the verge of 
admitting that he had authorized refills for Quistberg when 
Slagle took him out for consultation. He was being asked a hypo-
thetical question about whether he would have authorized refills 
if he had been contacted by the pharmacist, which called for a 
simple yes or no response. After interruption by Slagle, 
Appellant's counsel repeated the question and Goodman answered 
•yes,' the response Appellant had presumably wanted." 
C. The Petitioner's Claimed Errors in the Instructions to the 
Jury Do Not Constitute a Basis for Granting Certiorari. 
The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in 
refusing to give certain requested instructions. The Court of 
Appeals refused to reverse the decision in the trial court based 
on that claim because the Petitioner had not voiced adequate 
objections or exceptions pursuant to Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, To begin with, the jury was adequately instructed in 
this case. The instructions requested, which were refused, were 
merely more detailed instructions concerning Plaintiff's theories 
of negligence. Since the jury did find that Dr. Goodman was 
negligent, then the fact that the Plaintiff's requested instruc-
tions numbered 5 and 6 were not given made no difference. 
With regard to Requested Instruction 7A, Which is attached 
to the Petition as Appendix 0, the Court will r^ ote that the 
instruction is a distorted attempt to allow the Plaintiff to rely 
on the doctor's advise. There was not adequate evidence at the 
trial to support this jury instruction and there was no argument 
by Plaintiff that it was a proper statement of the law in the 
State of Utah. The only exception taken to Instruction 7A is set 
forth on page 817 of the record wherein it say^: "Instruction 
number 6 exception, it spells out the duty of the doctor, in 
appropriate circumstances to monitor the progress of his patient 
while using a controlled substance. The same exception for 
Instruction 7A." 
The Court of Appeals referred to the decision of E. A. 
Strout W. Realty v. W. C. Fov & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983). 
The Court noted that Appellant voiced no objections in the trial 
court to the correctness or completeness of th£ instructions that 
were actually given to the jury. Objections must be sufficiently 
specific to give the trial court notice of the claimed error. 
This issue was fully and completely dealt with by the Utah 
Court of Appeals and that decision should not pe disturbed here, 
since there is no reason set forth in the Plaintiff's Petition 
demanding any such attention. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals included its opinion with the 
following statement: 
The judgment is affirmed. Because we conclude that 
this appeal is frivolous, appellees1 request for 
sanctions pursuant to Utah Rules Appellate Procedure 33 
is granted. Appellees Goodman and Bryner Clinic are 
awarded double costs on appeal. 
The journey that the parties in this case have made to this 
point has been long, tedious and expensive. The claimed negli-
gent events took place in 1982. The Defendant has been forced to 
endure eight years of protracted litigation as a result of the 
Plaintiff's own misconduct. It is time that this dispute be put 
to rest. 
For these reasons, Dr. Gerald N. Goodman and the Bryner 
Clinic respectfully request that the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari be denied. 
DATED this ~7 day of August, 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By^ A 
David W. Slagle 
Attorneys for Defend^ rft/ 
Respondent Gerald N. Goodman 
and Bryner Clinic 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
SS. 
) 
David W. Slagle, being duly sworn, says that he is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys 
for respondents Goodman and Bryner Clinic herein; that he served 
the attached RESPONDENTS', GERALD N. GOODMAN AND BRYNER CLINIC'S 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (Supreme 
Court No. 880472, Court of Appeals No. 890270-CA, In the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah) upon the parties listed below by 
placing four (4) true and correct copies therepf in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Samuel King, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the H day of August, 1990. 
D<5Vid W. Slagle 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
1990. 
day of August, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
